Ethereum Exploits Drain an Estimated $4.48 Million From sBOLD Vault and Gonka Bridge

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Ethereum Exploits Drain an Estimated $4.48 Million From sBOLD Vault and Gonka Bridge

Reports dated Nov. 18, with no year specified in the incident notices cited here, described two separate Ethereum exploits. Blockaid estimated that about $4.48 million was drained from K3 Capital’s sBOLD vault and Gonka’s bridge. Bitquery later put the sBOLD loss slightly lower, at $3.42 million.

  • Blockaid estimated about $3.43 million was drained from sBOLD and $1.05 million from Gonka’s bridge.
  • Bitquery traced $1.78 million in payments to Ethereum block builders, but found no evidence they knew about the bot’s activity.
  • The precise exploit paths, final losses, recoveries and later status of both systems remain unclear.

What happened to K3 Capital’s sBOLD vault?

Blockaid reported that about $3.43 million left K3 Capital’s sBOLD vault. At 13:08 UTC, K3 said it was investigating malicious activity and had paused the vault’s contracts. The notice gave no loss estimate or timetable for reopening.

sBOLD is a third-party vault developed and maintained by K3 Capital, not a Liquity product. It pools BOLD, Liquity V2’s dollar-pegged stablecoin, and is designed to earn and reinvest rewards from Liquity’s Stability Pools. Vault shares represent depositors’ stakes in the pooled assets.

Blockaid’s initial explanation was that attackers acquired vault shares at low cost, then redeemed them for BOLD belonging to other depositors. The reports do not explain why the shares were cheap to obtain or identify the precise technical failure behind the exploit.

Bitquery’s later analysis estimated that about $3.42 million in value was removed from the vault. It counted 97 transactions across 37 Ethereum blocks, while Blockaid’s initial estimate referred to roughly 34 transactions. The reports do not explain how they counted transactions, so the figures should not be treated as directly comparable.

Bitquery placed the activity between 12:25:23 and 12:33:35 UTC, an eight-minute window. It said the vault was emptied during that period, about 35 minutes before K3 announced the pause. The $3.42 million figure is Bitquery’s estimate of the value removed, not an additional amount on top of the emptied vault. The reports cited here provide no final accounting of recoveries.

Bitquery attributed 57 transactions to one bot and estimated they accounted for 56% of the value removed. It also traced $1.78 million in payments to Ethereum block builders, about 52% of its estimated loss. Bitquery said the payments came from funds removed from the vault and found no indication the builders knew what the bot was doing. A payment connected to transaction processing does not, on its own, prove knowing participation.

The firms also differed on whether a Liquity trove, a borrower’s position, was liquidated. Blockaid’s initial alert pointed to a liquidation, while Bitquery said its transaction review found no trove liquidations. The available reporting does not resolve the discrepancy.

Gonka’s bridge faced a separate exploit

Blockaid estimated that about $1.05 million in stablecoins had been drained from Gonka’s Ethereum bridge in roughly five transactions. The firm said the activity was still underway when it published its estimate.

Gonka’s documented bridge handles two distinct asset flows. For stablecoins such as USDT and USDC, users lock tokens on Ethereum so corresponding wrapped versions can circulate on Gonka. For transfers of Gonka’s native GNK to Ethereum, GNK is placed in escrow on Gonka and equivalent WGNK is issued on Ethereum. When WGNK is returned, it is burned before the escrowed GNK is released.

Blockaid reported that the attacker drained stablecoins held in the bridge and minted WGNK without the corresponding GNK backing. Its $1.05 million estimate does not assign a separate value to the newly issued WGNK. Without a reliable figure for how much was minted, or evidence that it was sold or redeemed, adding a speculative token value would inflate the loss estimate.

Blockaid linked the incident to a change involving the bridge’s signing key, but the reported details do not establish who made the change, why it happened or exactly how it enabled the drain. The reports cited here also provide no later status update or recovery figure for either incident.

Liquity context, and what it does not prove

Liquity’s Stability Pools use deposited BOLD to cover debt when a borrower’s trove is liquidated. In February 2025, Liquity advised users to close their Stability Pool positions after identifying an issue. The protocol said the issue was isolated to those pools, that it knew of no affected users and that BOLD remained fully backed and redeemable.

Liquity announced that V2 was live on Ethereum mainnet on May 19, following further audits and testing. That history matters because sBOLD relied on rewards from Liquity’s Stability Pools. It does not establish that the February issue caused or contributed to the later reported sBOLD exploit.

Key questions and answers

  • How much was reportedly drained?

    Blockaid estimated $4.48 million across the two incidents: about $3.43 million from sBOLD and $1.05 million from Gonka’s bridge. Bitquery later estimated the sBOLD loss at $3.42 million.

  • Were the causes confirmed?

    No. Blockaid and Bitquery gave conflicting accounts of whether a trove was liquidated, and the reported details do not establish the precise failure behind either exploit.

  • Did block builders knowingly assist the sBOLD attacker?

    Bitquery traced $1.78 million in payments to builders but said it found no indication they knew about the bot’s activity.

  • How much were the unbacked WGNK tokens worth?

    No separate valuation was reported. The available information does not establish how much was minted or whether it was sold or redeemed.

The incidents involved different risks: sBOLD pooled depositors’ assets in a vault, while Gonka’s bridge held reserves and issued tokens across chains. The reported losses are estimates, not a final accounting. A full technical explanation, along with clear information on recoveries and the systems’ status, is still outstanding.

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