Why Bitcoin’s Quantum Security Upgrade May Take Years
Glassnode estimates that about 7.12 million BTC are associated with public keys visible on-chain. That does not mean their private keys are compromised or that a quantum computer can steal the coins today. The harder problem is preparing Bitcoin’s users and infrastructure for a possible future threat, and deciding what to do if some coins never migrate.
- Exposure is not compromise: A visible public key does not reveal its private key.
- Migration is the hard part: Wallets, custodians, exchanges and bridges must all adapt.
- There is no agreed Bitcoin policy: Developers have not settled whether migration should remain voluntary.
What Bitcoin’s exposed public keys mean
Bitcoin transactions use digital signatures to prove that someone is authorized to move funds. The network currently relies on ECDSA and Schnorr signatures. A public key verifies a signature. The private key creates one.
Glassnode’s November 10 analysis estimated that approximately 7.12 million BTC, or 35.4% of issued supply, were associated with public keys visible on-chain. An earlier October estimate counted more than 6 million BTC, or 31.2% of circulating coins. The figures use different supply measures and dates, so they are not directly comparable.
Glassnode attributed 25.8% of Bitcoin’s supply exposure to address reuse, including 11.6% held on exchanges. Exchange holdings are included in the address-reuse figure. They are not an additional share to add to it.
These estimates describe public-key visibility, not stolen keys or coins currently available to an attacker. Nor do they mean every counted coin faces the same level of risk. A public key exposed long ago through address reuse may present a different theoretical window of risk from one revealed only when its owner broadcasts a spending transaction. The figures alone do not show how long each key has been visible or whether its owner can still access the funds.
No publicly demonstrated quantum computer can currently break the signatures used to authorize Bitcoin transactions. The concern is conditional: a sufficiently powerful future quantum computer could, in theory, use a visible public key to derive its private key. Preparing for that possibility is prudent. Presenting it as an attack already underway is not.
The migration challenge goes beyond cryptography
A new signature system would be only one part of a Bitcoin upgrade. Users would need to move coins into compatible transaction types, and wallets and hardware devices would need to create and verify the new signatures. Exchanges, custodians and services connecting Bitcoin to other networks would also need to update their systems.
Some coins may be harder to migrate than others. Owners may have lost their keys or become unreachable, leaving no one able to move the funds. A network rule cannot make an inaccessible private key reappear. Deciding whether to restrict coins that remain in old formats also raises questions about ownership, not just security.
Cysic CEO Leo Fan summed up the practical challenge: The clock that matters is migration, he said. He added: Coins that never move are a social problem, not a technical one.
That distinction matters. Developers can specify cryptographic standards, but getting millions of users and organizations to adopt them is much messier. So is deciding what happens to coins that cannot be moved. Migration tools will be part of the challenge.
Bitcoin developers have not agreed on a migration policy
In April, Jameson Lopp and five other developers introduced BIP 361, a proposal to phase out the ECDSA and Schnorr signature systems Bitcoin currently uses. It proposes first restricting payments to addresses using vulnerable signatures, followed by requirements affecting coins that have not migrated. Its timeline would span several years after a compatible post-quantum transaction system is activated.
BIP 361 remains a proposal, not an activated Bitcoin consensus change. Developers have not agreed on whether holders should eventually have to move their coins. Lopp has argued that restricting access to dormant holdings could be preferable to leaving them available to a future attacker. Blockstream CEO Adam Back supports voluntary upgrades and opposes a predetermined deadline that could prevent legitimate owners from accessing their funds.
The disagreement is not just technical. A cutoff could reduce the amount of value left in vulnerable formats, but it could also strand coins whose owners still have a legitimate claim to them. Voluntary migration avoids imposing a cutoff, but leaves open what to do if some coins never move.
BIP 360 is a separate draft proposing a Pay-to-Merkle-Root output type that removes Taproot’s key-path spending option. It could reduce the risk associated with a public key that has been exposed for a long time. The proposal does not, by itself, add quantum-resistant signatures or eliminate every possible attack. It changes an output’s spending path rather than replacing Bitcoin’s signature system.
Neither proposal has been adopted as a Bitcoin consensus change. There is no agreed activation date for a post-quantum Bitcoin transaction system, and no settled policy for coins that remain in older formats.
Standards and demonstrations are not a Bitcoin-wide upgrade
The National Institute of Standards and Technology finalized post-quantum signature standards in 2024. In January 2026, it issued a separate call for proposals on threshold cryptography. Threshold systems let multiple participants jointly perform cryptographic operations. That work is distinct from standardizing post-quantum signatures.
Even a finalized signature standard does not automatically make it usable on Bitcoin. Bitcoin would still need compatible transaction formats and validation rules, along with network agreement and support from wallets and other services.
Institutional custody adds another layer. Custodians often distribute transaction approvals among several people or machines. Multi-party computation, or MPC, lets participants carry out cryptographic operations together instead of giving one participant sole control of the operation.
BitGo and Silence Laboratories completed a simulated post-quantum transaction using the ML-DSA signature standard within an MPC system. The companies had not announced a production deployment. A simulation shows that a technical approach can work. It does not show that a system is ready to handle customer assets at scale.
Ledger technology chief Charles Guillemet expects the transition to take years because wallets, hardware devices and transaction systems all need compatible protections. Coinbase’s October recommendations also identified signature sizes, transaction fees, network capacity and wallet compatibility as factors developers must consider. No quantified effects on Bitcoin were provided for those factors.
Other networks are testing different approaches
Rootstock’s published roadmap plans protocol-level post-quantum signatures and hybrid accounts for 2027, followed by an assisted account migration program in 2028. Its bridge-related work includes upgrading specialized signing infrastructure, developing hardware security module protections and preparing changes to how Bitcoin assets move between networks.
Rootstock’s PowPeg locks bitcoin on Bitcoin’s blockchain and supports corresponding RBTC assets on the Rootstock sidechain. Rootstock can upgrade its own systems and bridge arrangements, but it cannot independently change Bitcoin’s underlying protocol.
NEAR introduced ML-DSA transaction signing through a July mainnet upgrade, while Algorand launched native Falcon-1024 accounts in August. Broader institutional multisignature support and additional wallet integrations for Algorand remained under development. These are steps on those networks, not evidence that Bitcoin has adopted a post-quantum upgrade.
Key questions about Bitcoin and quantum security
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Does a visible Bitcoin public key mean its private key is compromised?
No. Public-key visibility is not evidence that anyone has obtained the private key, and no publicly demonstrated quantum computer can currently break Bitcoin’s transaction signatures.
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Has Bitcoin adopted a quantum-security upgrade?
No. BIP 360 and BIP 361 remain proposals or drafts, not activated consensus changes. Developers have not agreed on a network-wide migration policy.
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Why could migration take years?
Users must move coins, while wallets, hardware, exchanges, custodians and bridges need compatible systems. Lost keys and unreachable owners make some coins difficult or impossible to migrate.
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Will owners be forced to move their coins?
That remains unsettled. BIP 361 proposes phased restrictions, while Adam Back supports voluntary upgrades to avoid blocking legitimate owners from dormant funds.
Prepare without pretending the threat is here
Bitcoin has time to study the risk, but preparation involves more than choosing a new signature standard. The network must agree on transaction rules, give users and institutions workable migration tools, and confront the difficult case of coins that cannot be moved.
Bitcoin’s resistance to unilateral control makes coordinated upgrades harder. That friction can slow a response, but it also means no single party can casually decide that someone else’s funds should be locked away. Any serious migration plan will have to reckon with both sides of that trade-off.