Curve Fee Burner Exploit Diverts $38,205 in DAO Revenue; User Funds Unaffected

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Curve Fee Burner Exploit Diverts $38,205 in DAO Revenue; User Funds Unaffected

Curve’s Fee Burner Exploit Drained 38, 205.76 USDC

A flaw in Curve Finance’s CowSwapBurner contract let an attacker use approved order details to execute different trades and divert accumulated DAO fee revenue. Curve said the exploit happened on November 10, 2026. User deposits, lending markets, and crvUSD holdings were not affected.

  • 138 unauthorized trades involved 135 tokens.
  • The flaw failed to tie an approved order description to the order actually executed.
  • Curve paused the fee-conversion system and returned remaining burner balances to FeeCollector contracts.
  • As of Curve’s November 17 update, the stolen funds had not been recovered.

What CowSwapBurner was supposed to do

Curve collected administrative fees from its pools and markets, then sent the tokens to CowSwapBurner. The contract sold them through CoW Protocol and sent the proceeds to Curve’s FeeCollector, the contract designated to receive the revenue, in crvUSD, Curve’s stablecoin.

Under the regular schedule, fee tokens were transferred on Mondays, sold during a 24-hour window starting Tuesday, and distributed on Wednesdays. The burner was meant to accept orders that sold tokens for crvUSD, sent the proceeds to the FeeCollector, and met a minimum sale amount of 500 crvUSD.

According to Curve’s incident account, the problem was in the burner’s isValidSignature function. It checked whether an order description met the required conditions but did not check whether that description matched the actual order CoW Protocol was settling.

An order hash is a cryptographic identifier for a specific order. Because the contract did not check that hash, its approval was not properly tied to the order being executed. Curve said the attacker reused details from a legitimate order description to authorize different trades and redirect the proceeds. The reported information does not establish that the attacker forged or stole a user’s signature.

Curve’s account also says CoW Protocol had unlimited allowances to spend tokens held by the burner. An allowance gives a contract permission to spend a token on behalf of another address. That allowance did not cause the reported validation flaw, but broad spending permission can make the damage worse when another safeguard fails.

138 trades turned small balances into a larger loss

The first unauthorized trade settled at 00:07 UTC on November 10, seven minutes after the weekly trading window opened. According to the reported schedule, the window began at 00:00 UTC that Tuesday. The trade sold the burner’s YB balance for USDC and sent the proceeds to the attacker’s wallet.

The attacker then reused the legitimate order description for 137 more trades. By 00:24 UTC, 133 fraudulent orders had settled. The remaining five settled over the next several hours, with the final unauthorized trade completing at 11:10 UTC.

The 138 orders involved 135 tokens and brought the attacker 38, 205.76 USDC. The trades were generally small. Curve’s reported figures put the median fraudulent order at about $254, and only two exceeded $500.

Many of the balances had not been sold before because they were below the burner’s 500 crvUSD minimum. For tokens that had been sold previously, the median time since the last sale was 161 days. The figures point to a sweep of accumulated, relatively small balances, not a single large pool of user deposits.

Curve said it reviewed 6, 558 orders settled through the burner since its deployment in June 2024. It identified the 138 unauthorized trades as the only orders whose proceeds did not reach the FeeCollector. This was Curve’s review, as relayed by crypto.news, not an independently described audit.

Legitimate conversions also took place. Curve reported that 36 orders involving 35 tokens generated 97, 317.74 crvUSD for the FeeCollector. That is a separate amount in a different asset, so it does not offset the USDC stolen.

Where the funds went

Curve reported that within four hours of the exploit, the attacker exchanged 37, 611.76 USDC for ETH, split the funds across four addresses, and bridged them to Arbitrum. The reported account does not identify the bridge. More detail on on-chain activity after the exploit does not fill in that gap.

About 37, 229.89 USDC later reached Hyperliquid and was exchanged for 65.41 XMR1, which Curve described as a Monero-linked asset. Curve said the balance remained untouched as of November 16. The available information does not establish that XMR1 is Monero itself or explain how the asset is structured.

On November 15, the attacker converted the remaining 594 USDC into ETH and deposited 0.3 ETH into Tornado Cash. Adding the reported amounts of 37, 611.76 USDC and 594 USDC accounts for the original total. But the account does not explain the 381.87 USDC difference between the amount exchanged for ETH and the amount later reported at Hyperliquid. It also does not provide enough detail to reconcile the 594 USDC conversion with the 0.3 ETH deposit. Filling in those gaps would be guesswork.

As of Curve’s November 17 update, the funds had not been recovered. The reported information did not establish the attacker’s identity or how much might ultimately be recoverable.

Curve’s response and the proposed replacement

After receiving an external vulnerability report on November 10, Curve’s Emergency DAO disabled fee collection and trading on Ethereum at 13:59 UTC. Similar precautionary measures followed on Arbitrum and Base at 16:55 UTC.

On November 17, the Emergency DAO returned residual token balances from the old fee-conversion contracts on Ethereum, Base, and Arbitrum to their respective FeeCollector contracts. Ethereum fee conversion remained paused while fees continued to accumulate, according to crypto.news. Curve also advised teams running CowSwapBurner forks to check their deployments. The reported information does not establish that any forks were exploited.

A governance proposal opened on November 13 and was scheduled to close on November 20, 2026. It sought to replace the burner with an auction system that verifies the actual order hash. Crypto.news described the proposed design as a descending-price auction. In plain terms, the system would use an auction to convert the tokens instead of the existing burner flow. The supplied details do not explain how the auction would work.

As of November 17, the proposal’s outcome, any replacement deployment, and a date for resuming Ethereum fee conversion had not been confirmed. Curve said user deposits, lending markets, and crvUSD holdings were unaffected. The loss came from accumulated protocol fee revenue, not customer deposits. But protocol revenue is still money, and “not user funds” does not mean “no harm done.”

Key questions and answers

  • How did the attacker exploit CowSwapBurner?

    The contract checked an order description but did not confirm that it matched the order hash for the trade being executed. Curve said that mismatch let the attacker redirect proceeds away from the FeeCollector.

  • How much was stolen, and whose funds were they?

    The attacker diverted 38, 205.76 USDC in accumulated Curve DAO fee revenue. Curve said user deposits, lending markets, and crvUSD holdings were unaffected.

  • Were the stolen funds recovered?

    No recovery had been reported as of November 17, 2026. The published fund movements do not establish how much may ultimately be recoverable.

  • What remains unresolved about fee conversion?

    As of November 17, the governance proposal was scheduled to close on November 20, but its outcome and any replacement deployment had not been confirmed. Curve had not announced when Ethereum fee conversion would resume.

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