A flaw in K3 Capital’s sBOLD vault accounting let an attacker mint shares for far less than they should have cost, then redeem BOLD belonging to other depositors. SlowMist and Gate reported that the Ethereum vault lost about $3.43 million on November 18, 2026.
- Gate says 99.9% of the vault’s assets were drained.
- SlowMist points to a flaw in the vault’s totalAssets accounting.
- Gate reported 99 transactions over 7.5 minutes. That does not show how many attackers were involved.
- A 15% bounty and a transfer of about 131, 000 BOLD in borrowing fees have been reported. Neither confirms that depositors have been repaid.
How the sBOLD vault was exploited
SlowMist’s hacked-project tracker says the attacker used flash-loaned wstETH and exploited a flaw in the vault’s totalAssets calculation. The reported sequence involved self-liquidating Liquity V2 troves, manipulating sBOLD share accounting, minting shares at an artificially low cost, then redeeming other depositors’ BOLD.
A trove is a collateralized borrowing position in Liquity V2. In the reported attack, the attacker used wstETH to liquidate their own positions. SlowMist says this was part of a sequence that took advantage of how the sBOLD vault accounted for its assets.
A flash loan lets someone borrow assets and repay them within a single blockchain transaction. If the borrower does not repay the loan before the transaction ends, the transaction reverts. Flash loans also have legitimate uses, including trading. In this case, they reportedly gave the attacker temporary capital to exploit the vault’s accounting.
The totalAssets figure is the vault’s reported balance of underlying assets. It helps determine how many shares a deposit or withdrawal should represent. It is not simply a direct market price. If the figure is wrong, the shares issued may represent an inaccurate claim on the vault. SlowMist says the flaw let the attacker mint sBOLD shares too cheaply, then redeem BOLD belonging to other depositors.
A rapid drain, but no confirmed crowd of attackers
SlowMist and Gate date the incident to November 18, 2026, and report losses of about $3.43 million. Gate puts the loss at approximately 3.43 million BOLD, worth about $3.43 million, and says it accounted for 99.9% of the vault’s assets.
Gate also reports 99 transactions over 7.5 minutes. That shows how quickly events unfolded, but it does not prove there were 99 separate attacks or several independent attackers. The available reporting does not establish that copycat attackers joined in.
SlowMist says K3 paused the contracts, but the available reporting gives no verified pause time. It does not support claims that the vault was paused 40 minutes after the first transactions.
Gate says Liquity V2 and 1inch were not themselves affected. Liquity V2 was part of the reported attack path, but the identified accounting flaw was in K3’s sBOLD vault, not a general compromise of either protocol.
What is known about recovery?
Gate reports that K3 offered a 15% bounty to entities involved in returning assets. It also says about 131, 000 BOLD in attacker-paid borrowing fees flowed into Yearn’s yBOLD and ysyBOLD products before being transferred to the sBOLD recovery address.
That transfer involved borrowing fees, not confirmed repayment of the stolen principal. The available information does not show how much of the drained BOLD has been recovered, what amount will ultimately go to investors, or whether depositors will be made whole.
A bounty may encourage an attacker or intermediary to return funds, but it guarantees nothing. Until K3 provides a final recovery figure and details on distribution, investors’ eventual losses remain uncertain.
Key questions and answers
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How much did the sBOLD vault lose?
SlowMist and Gate report losses of about $3.43 million. Gate says that represented 99.9% of the vault’s assets.
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What was the reported vulnerability?
SlowMist identifies a flaw in the vault’s totalAssets accounting. It reportedly let the attacker mint sBOLD shares at an artificially low cost.
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Were Liquity V2 or 1inch compromised?
Gate says neither protocol was itself affected. Liquity V2 was part of the reported attack path, but the flaw was in K3’s sBOLD vault.
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Have investors been repaid?
The reported information includes no final recovery or distribution total. The bounty and transfer of borrowing fees to a recovery address do not confirm that depositors have been made whole.
Why vault accounting deserves scrutiny
SlowMist describes sBOLD as a yield-bearing ERC-4626 vault built on Liquity V2 Stability Pools. ERC-4626 is a standard for tokenized vaults. Users deposit assets and receive shares that represent a claim on the pooled funds. That convenience relies on accurate accounting. A flawed asset calculation can distort how many shares a deposit should receive and, as this incident illustrates, open the door to an attack.
For depositors, advertised yield is only part of the risk. It is also worth knowing how a vault calculates its assets and share value, and whether its accounting has been tested against unusual transaction sequences. In sBOLD’s case, SlowMist’s account points to the interaction between flash-loaned wstETH, Liquity V2 positions, and vault share accounting. The problem was more than a yield promise gone wrong.