Kruw says its Bitcoin CoinJoin users accounted for 1.6% of blockspace. Investigator ZachXBT has countered with a serious allegation: that Lazarus Group was Kruw’s largest user and the coordinator knew it. A June 2025 Secret Service alert had already identified Kruw.io as a service used by Lazarus. But the available evidence does not show that funds traced from the Bitget hacker passed through Kruw. This account covers developments through Nov. 19, 2025.
- Kruw disclosed 1.6% and 1.1% blockspace figures but gave no timeframe or calculation method.
- Arkham traced 2, 173.76 BTC from wallets labeled as belonging to the Bitget hacker into CoinJoin, not specifically into Kruw.
- The Secret Service separately named Kruw.io as a service used by Lazarus.
- The key question is what Kruw knew and did, not simply whether criminals used a privacy tool.
Kruw’s blockspace claim meets a blunt accusation
On Nov. 17, Kruw said its coordinator’s users accounted for 1.6% of Bitcoin’s total blockspace. It cited an earlier figure of 1.1%, posted on Aug. 5. Neither post, as described, gave a measurement period or explained how the figure was calculated.
Bitcoin blockspace is the capacity available in blocks for transactions, measured in transaction weight. A share of blockspace is not a share of Bitcoin’s value or transaction count. Without Kruw’s timeframe and methodology, including how it assigns the weight of a CoinJoin transaction among participants, the percentages are hard to assess or compare.
ZachXBT challenged Kruw’s claim on X:
“Posting this while fully knowing your largest ‘user’ is currently Lazarus Group laundering hundreds of millions from exploits?”
That is an allegation, not a verified customer ranking. The available information does not establish that Lazarus was Kruw’s largest individual user at the time. It also does not show what evidence supports ZachXBT’s claim that Kruw knew the group’s identity.
What Arkham traced, and what it did not
Arkham reported that 2, 173.76 BTC, valued at $154.45 million, entered CoinJoin from wallets it labeled as belonging to the Bitget hacker. Of that amount, 2, 065.43 BTC went directly into WabiSabi CoinJoin rounds. Another 108.33 BTC first passed through new addresses.
CoinJoin combines inputs and outputs from multiple users in a collaborative Bitcoin transaction. It can make it harder to determine which outputs correspond to particular inputs, but it does not erase transaction history or guarantee anonymity. The same feature that supports financial privacy can also make stolen funds harder to trace.
Arkham’s figures cover Bitcoin entering CoinJoin. They do not show what share, if any, passed through Kruw’s coordinator. Nor does the available information link the Bitget hacker to Lazarus. Those are separate claims. Treating them as the same actor or the same funds would go beyond the evidence presented.
In a later 11-day tally, Arkham said 2, 266.68 BTC, worth $161.04 million, left wallets it had labeled as belonging to the Bitget hacker. The 2, 173.76 BTC it tracked entering CoinJoin amounts to about 95.9% of those outflows by BTC amount. That does not mean 95.9% of the stolen funds were laundered through Kruw, or even that all the CoinJoin activity involved one service.
Arkham’s earlier six-day tally recorded 1, 052.34 BTC leaving the tracked wallets, with 847.26 BTC entering CoinJoin. In updates covering activity around Nov. 14 to 16, Arkham reported outflows of 351.96 BTC on Nov. 14 and 316.35 BTC on Nov. 15. At its Nov. 16 cutoff, it counted 77.07 BTC: 55 BTC entered six CoinJoin rounds, 21.35 BTC moved to new addresses in eight transactions, and 0.72 BTC moved in two earlier transactions.
Arkham said the labeled wallets had sent out an average of 206.06 BTC a day since Nov. 6, with 34.63 BTC, valued at $2.25 million, remaining in them. The firm cautioned that newly used addresses might also belong to the attacker and that some transactions combined labeled and unlabeled inputs. It also said the funds could have moved through over-the-counter desks or laundering services.
The Secret Service had already named Kruw.io
ZachXBT’s accusation came after a June 2025 U.S. Secret Service alert identified Kruw.io as a service used by Lazarus. The agency said Lazarus had previously mixed approximately $14.3 million in stolen cryptocurrency through the service and was using it to launder some proceeds of the $1.5 billion Bybit theft.
The alert described Kruw.io as the most prolific service to emerge offering CoinJoin through the Wasabi protocol after zkSNACKs stopped its own coordination service. That is a significant association. By itself, it does not show that Lazarus was Kruw’s largest user, that the service handled the Bitget-linked funds Arkham tracked, or that its operator knew every user’s identity.
The closure of zkSNACKs’ coordination service is part of a broader debate over Bitcoin privacy. In May 2024, Edward Snowden urged Bitcoin developers to provide privacy at the protocol level during discussion following the shutdown announcement. The tension is real: financial privacy can protect ordinary users, while tools that make transaction links harder to infer can also attract criminals.
The Samourai case is a comparison, not proof against Kruw
The U.S. prosecution of Samourai Wallet’s founders shows that privacy-service operators can face serious consequences when prosecutors allege conduct beyond simply providing a tool. The Justice Department said Keonne Rodriguez and William Lonergan Hill knowingly transmitted more than $237 million in criminal proceeds through Samourai.
Prosecutors said more than 80, 000 BTC passed through Samourai’s Whirlpool and Ricochet services, generating over $6 million in fees. They also said the founders marketed the service to criminal users, including on a darknet forum, and encouraged hackers to send stolen funds through Whirlpool.
Rodriguez and Hill pleaded guilty to conspiracy to operate a money-transmitting business. Rodriguez was sentenced to five years in prison on Nov. 6, 2025, and Hill to four years on Nov. 19. Each also received three years of supervised release and a $250, 000 fine. The Justice Department said the founders paid $6, 367, 139.69 in forfeiture, which it described as fees earned by the service.
Those guilty pleas and sentences do not establish what Kruw knew or did. The Samourai case offers context for enforcement against service operators, but it is not evidence against Kruw or a definitive answer about the legal obligations of every CoinJoin coordinator.
Key questions and answers
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Did Arkham prove that 2, 173.76 BTC went through Kruw?
No. Arkham traced that amount from wallets it linked to the Bitget hacker into CoinJoin, but did not attribute all or any specific share of it to Kruw’s coordinator.
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Did U.S. authorities link Kruw.io to Lazarus?
Yes. A June 2025 Secret Service alert identified Kruw.io as a service used by Lazarus. It cited approximately $14.3 million in previously mixed stolen cryptocurrency and separately said Lazarus was using the service to launder some proceeds of the Bybit theft.
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Is it established that Lazarus was Kruw’s largest user?
No. ZachXBT made that allegation, but the available information provides no customer ranking or evidence showing what Kruw knew about Lazarus’s identity.
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Should CoinJoin coordinators be held responsible for users’ crimes?
The facts presented establish no finding about Kruw’s knowledge or conduct. The Samourai case shows that prosecutors pursued operators based on specific allegations and guilty pleas. It is a comparison, not evidence against Kruw.
The unresolved questions are specific
CoinJoin’s dual use is no excuse to ignore evidence of knowing assistance to criminals. But suspicious flows and a public accusation alone do not prove what a coordinator’s operator knew. Kruw’s blockspace figures need a timeframe and method. Arkham’s traced CoinJoin activity needs a coordinator-specific breakdown before it can be tied to Kruw. And the evidence behind ZachXBT’s claims about Lazarus’s status and Kruw’s knowledge remains unclear. Lazarus’s broader crypto crime activity has included operations across the region, while fake macOS meeting invites targeting crypto executives show the group’s range of tactics.