Ethena says users must pass screening to mint or redeem USDe directly. The policy drew renewed attention after reports that wallets linked to illicit activity used Sky’s open stablecoin swap route. Those reported flows involved Sky’s system, though, and do not show that USDe was involved.
- Ethena limits direct USDe minting and redemption to approved counterparties.
- Other users can still get USDe through secondary markets.
- Inca Digital identified $518 million in transactions involving 422 flagged wallets, not $518 million in confirmed stolen funds.
- The figures show the trade-off between permissionless access and controls on financial flows.
Ethena restricts direct access to USDe
In a Nov. 19 statement, Ethena said users and partners had asked how its USDe minting and redemption contracts work after allegations surfaced about another onchain dollar system. Ethena said direct access has been limited to approved counterparties since launch.
Applicants, including market makers and other clients, must complete identity or business verification and sanctions and anti-money-laundering checks. Ethena says it reviews both onchain and offchain activity.
Minting creates USDe against eligible backing assets. When users redeem, the protocol burns USDe and returns eligible backing assets, under the terms agreed with the approved counterparty. Ethena’s terms reserve direct redemption through Ethena BVI for approved mint users and allow restrictions imposed by an authority.
This limits direct dealings with Ethena. It does not ban users from buying or holding USDe. Those outside the approved list can get it through external liquidity pools, including swaps routed through Ethena’s app.
Ethena has described permissioned minting and redemption as a “competitive disadvantage for USDe” at times. The company says the controls reduce security risks and help it meet its obligations to regulated custodians holding collateral. Those are Ethena’s stated reasons. The available information does not independently show how effective the screening is or how often approvals are reviewed.
What Inca Digital reported about Sky’s swap route
Ethena’s statement and the scrutiny of Sky both raise a broader question: where do crypto systems apply screening, and where can users move assets without it? They do not show that Ethena and Sky shared responsibility for the reported transactions.
Sky’s LitePSM lets users swap USDC for DAI or USDS at a fixed rate, subject to fees and available liquidity. It uses a pool of tokens that have already been minted. CoinDesk reported that the PSM itself does not require identity checks or screen transactions. Users may access it through third-party services, some of which may have their own controls.
CoinDesk reported that blockchain analytics firm Inca Digital identified $518 million in swap transactions involving 422 wallets linked to hacks, phishing, sanctioned entities, or addresses blacklisted by Circle or Tether. Inca attributed $101.9 million of the activity to North Korean actors. The available reporting does not include Inca’s full attribution methodology.
Those figures describe reported transaction activity involving flagged wallets. They do not show that every dollar was stolen, that the total represents unique funds, or that every transaction was knowingly illicit. The total may count the same assets moving more than once, but the available information does not say whether it does.
CoinDesk also reported that wallets funded by assets stolen in the February 2025 Bybit hack routed $91.5 million through the PSM in the 10 days after the theft. That amount should not be added to the $101.9 million. The reports do not explain how the figures overlap or whether they cover the same flows.
A separate finding from blockchain compliance firm Nominis put North Korea-linked USDC and DAI transfers into Sky’s PSM liquidity at more than $90 million. Nominis and Inca reported figures with different scopes, and it is unclear how much they overlap.
CoinDesk also reported that 95% of the transactions in Inca’s findings reached the PSM through aggregators, including 1inch, ParaSwap and MetaMask Swaps. That points to a practical limit on protocol-level controls: screening at one interface cannot stop users from reaching an open contract by other routes.
Sky’s response and what a flagged wallet can tell us
The Sky Frontier Foundation told CoinDesk that most flagged activity by value took place from 2021 to mid-2024 and accounted for less than 0.06% of PSM volume. The foundation said it screens wallets on its own websites and that almost all the flagged transactions appeared to have come through third-party trading services.
The foundation also warned that a flagged wallet may handle funds unrelated to a particular theft. That matters because a link to a suspicious wallet does not, on its own, establish where every asset it has touched came from.
The foundation’s figures leave questions about the reported flows unanswered. The available reporting does not explain how its date range relates to the post-Bybit transactions, how it calculated the share of volume, or what measures Sky took in response.
USDC reserves and the conditional freeze risk
CoinDesk reported that the PSM held roughly $2.7 billion in USDC in a single Ethereum wallet. Sky said the wallet was set up through Coinbase Prime and that independent keys were destroyed after setup, leaving the PSM in control of moving the assets. The reporting does not clarify exactly how this works or establish what a freeze would prevent.
Circle’s terms allow it to block certain USDC addresses. They also say Circle may have to freeze USDC or surrender the corresponding dollars in response to a valid legal order. These are separate provisions: the terms give Circle the ability to block addresses and describe its potential obligations under legal process. They do not show that the Sky wallet has been frozen or that an order exists.
A freeze of USDC in the reserve wallet could put a system that relies on those assets at risk. The consequences for DAI or USDS would depend on the legal basis, protocol mechanics, available liquidity and Sky’s response. The reported information does not support a claim that a freeze would inevitably cause either stablecoin to lose its peg.
U.S. Treasury guidance says people and companies subject to U.S. sanctions jurisdiction must avoid unauthorized transactions involving blocked parties or property. It advises digital-asset firms to tailor sanctions screening and other controls to their risks. Not every service or transaction has the same legal obligations, but the guidance highlights the pressure on systems that let assets move between different levels of oversight.
Key questions and answers
-
Who can mint or directly redeem USDe?
Ethena says approved counterparties can use its direct contracts after verification and sanctions and anti-money-laundering checks. Its terms reserve direct redemption for approved mint users, subject to applicable agreements and restrictions.
-
Can other users obtain USDe?
Yes. They can buy it through external liquidity pools, but that does not give them direct minting or redemption access with Ethena.
-
Did Inca establish that $518 million was stolen?
No. The figure covers reported swap activity involving wallets linked to illicit activity. It is not a confirmed total of stolen funds or victim losses.
-
Does a flagged wallet prove every transaction is illicit?
No. The Sky Frontier Foundation warned that a flagged wallet may also handle funds unrelated to a specific theft.
-
Has Circle frozen Sky’s reported USDC reserve?
No such freeze has been reported. Circle’s terms allow it to block addresses and describe its obligations in response to valid legal orders, but the effect of any hypothetical freeze on DAI or USDS is unknown.
Ethena’s policy shows how screening can limit direct access without closing off secondary markets. Sky’s PSM shows how open conversion routes can make stablecoins easier to use and harder to screen at the protocol level. The key questions are concrete: which transactions are being counted, how wallet links are established, and who can restrict access when evidence emerges. For more context on Ethena, price predictions are no substitute for scrutinizing the mechanisms and risks.